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Abstract
In reverse auctions, buyers often retain the right to bargain further concessions from
the winners. The optimal form of such procurement is an English auction followed by
an auctioneer’s option to engage in ultimatum bargaining with the winners. We study
behavior and performance in this procurement format using a laboratory experiment.
Sellers closely follow the equilibrium strategy of exiting the auction at their costs
and then accepting strictly profitable offers. Buyers generally exercise their option to
bargain according to their equilibrium strategy, but their take-it-or-leave-it offers vary
positively with auction prices when they should be invariant. We explain this deviation
by modeling buyers’ subjective posteriors regarding the winners’ costs as distortions
of the Bayesian posteriors, calculated using a formulation similar to a commonly used
probability weighting function. We further test the robustness of the experimental
results and the subjective posterior explanation with three additional experimental
treatments.
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1 Introduction
Auctions that set a benchmark price and award exclusive rights to negotiate final purchase
terms are commonly used in many areas of commerce such as procurement in supply chains
(Tunca and Wu, 2009; Elmaghraby, 2007), corporate mergers and acquisitions (Hege, Slovin,
Lovo, and Sushka, 2009), and even in professional sports when teams exchange the rights of
players.1 This practice is particularly common in government procurement. For example, we
learned in interviews with the procurement center of the Hunan Province in China that in
2012 they attempted to procure over 9000 orthopedic related objects, with over 12000 unique
suppliers participating in the process. Whenever there were at least three qualified suppliers
they conducted a reverse auction. If the auction price didn’t meet their basis price, then
they further negotiated with the auction winning supplier. Sometimes bargaining resulted
in an improved price, and other times in no purchase at all. This case exhibits two key
characteristics of effective auction-bargaining practice: further negotiations are often chosen,
and sometimes trade doesn’t occur even when there are potential benefits to both parties.
There is a strong theoretical basis for using the auction-bargaining mechanism. A seminal
article by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) shows that conducting a reverse (forward) English
auction with the auctioneer retaining the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
auction winner implements the optimal mechanism - Myerson (1981) - to sell (purchase) an
object. On the other hand, they also establish the auctioneer’s expected welfare increases by
foregoing this auction-bargaining mechanism and instead conducting an English auction with
an additional serious bidder. Unfortunately, identifying and validating additional serious
bidders is often cost prohibitive and difficult, particularly in the procurement setting (Wan
and Beil, 2009; Wan, Beil, and Katok, 2012). Consequently, we feel evaluating behavior and
performance in Bulow and Klemperer’s auction-bargaining mechanism within a procurement
setting is an important task.
The Nash equilibrium implementing the optimal mechanism, despite having a simple
structure, relies upon some behaviorally questionable assumptions. A seller’s strategy is to
exit the auction when her costs exceeds the auction price, and accept any subsequent prof-
itable ultimatum offer. This opposes what is observed in ultimatum game experiments where
responders commonly reject profitable offers that are less than equitable even when expe-
rienced (Cooper and Dutcher, 2011), or there is incomplete information about the amount
1For example the Nippon Professional Baseball League and Korean Baseball Organization have a posting
system, that allows a player to ask his current team to conduct an auction granting a period of exclusive
negotiating rights to a Major League Baseball team; about one player per year leaves the Nippon League
through this process. An even more relevant practice - in which no compensation occurs in absence of a
final contract - is trade of players between teams in the National Basketball Association or National Football
League conditional upon the player and new team agreeing to a contract extension.
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of potential gains from exchange (Croson, 1996; Harstad and Nagel, 2004).2 In our ex-
periment, sellers generally exit the auction at their cost, and they rarely reject profitable
take-it-or-leave-it offers.
The buyer’s equilibrium strategy is characterized by a price threshold that is conditional
upon his willingness-to-pay. He accepts an auction outcome when the price is below his
threshold; otherwise, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer equal to the threshold. This strat-
egy has the uncanny flavor of an ex post reserve price, and that is not a coincidence. Both
the auction-bargaining mechanism and the English auction with an ex ante reserve price
implement the optimal direct mechanism. As a consequence, the buyer’s threshold in the
auction-bargaining mechanism is the optimal reserve price in the English auction, and there-
fore independent of the realized auction price. But this appears paradoxical; the buyer only
commits to a threshold after the auction, and hence gaining additional information about
the winning seller’s cost. We show the price invariance of the buyer’s threshold crucially
relies upon the buyer forming correct Bayesian posterior beliefs regarding the winner’s cost.
This result must seem paradoxical to the subjects as well. While the buyer’s strategy
accurately predicts when auction outcomes are rejected in favor of further bargaining, sub-
sequent take-it-or-leave-it offers have a strong positive relationship with the auction price -
contradicting the prediction of price invariance. This results in reducing the buyer’s surplus
by approximately 7.5%. We also find substantial individual heterogeneity in this auction
price sensitivity.
We find an explanation for this behavior by generalizing how a buyer formulates his
posterior belief regarding the auction winner’s cost conditional upon the auction price. We
propose the subjective posterior is formed by applying the two-parameter Prelec (1998) prob-
ability weighting function to transform the Bayesian posterior. This allows the subjective
posterior to flexibly reflect differing types of perceived affiliation between the auction price
and winner’s cost. Structural estimates of this model demonstrate its ability to capture
both the observed wide varying pattern of buyer behavior and the general property of the
positive relationship between auction price and bargaining offer. We further show that sim-
ply allowing for risk aversion does not lead to any relationship between auction price and
bargaining offer, and anticipated regret only leads to a negative relationship. Thus, of these
three alternatives, our subjective posterior model is the only plausible explanation.
We also conduct additional treatments to challenge the robustness our explanation and
findings. First, we enrich the feedback that auction losing sellers receive by informing them of
the actions taken in negotiation phase. However, this does not give impetus to any increased
adherence to their equilibrium strategy in the auction phase nor inspire any rejections of
2An exception is found in Salmon and Wilson (2008) which we later discuss in detail.
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profitable offers. Second, we challenge the distorted posterior explanation with the alter-
native hypothesis that buyer’s don’t hold accurate beliefs about the seller’s strategies. In
response, we run a treatment where buyers play against computerized sellers automated to
follow the equilibrium strategy. We also inform buyers about the nature of these sellers. The
buyer’s offers are still sensitive to the price and the estimated posteriors, on average, exhibit
stronger affiliation between the winner’s and loser’s costs.
Finally we explore whether distorted ‘subjective posteriors’ are an easily corrected bias.
We augment the computerized seller treatment by giving buyers a calculator that provides
detailed information on the probability of acceptance for alternative offers and expected
payoffs. We even obligate them to inspect this information for any take-it-or-leave-it offer
they make. The results are startling in that buyer’s don’t make offers more in line with
the Bayesian benchmark, but rather they show a greater willingness to bargain and make
offers reflecting even more distorted posterior beliefs. This has practical implications for
management practice; distorted subject posteriors can’t be corrected by simply providing
expert decision support systems.
2 Basic theory
We present an alternative derivation of the Nash equilibrium of the auction-bargaining mech-
anism that elucidates how the buyer dynamically processes information influences his strat-
egy.3 Consider a buyer who desires an indivisible object. His value for this object is the
random variable v with the absolutely continuous distribution function H(v) on the interval
[v, v], v > 0, and associated probability distribution function h(v). Only the buyer knows
his realized valuation. There are N possible sellers, indexed by i. Upon selling an object,
seller i incurs a unit cost of ci. Each seller’s unit cost is an independent random variable
with the common absolutely continuous distribution function F (c) on the interval [0, c] and
associated probability distribution function f(c). We also assume that c + F (c)
f(c)
is strictly
increasing on the support of F . Only a seller knows her realized cost, which she learns prior
to any strategic interaction. H(v) and F (c) are also independent, so a seller’s realized cost
reveals no additional information about the buyer’s value.
Here are the specific rules of the auction-bargaining mechanism. First, the sellers compete
in a reverse English clock auction in which price starts at c and all N sellers in the auction.
Price falls with time, and a seller can irreversibly exit the auction at any time. The auctions
closes, and setting the auction price p, when either N − 1 sellers have exited or price reaches
zero. Ties in either being the N − 1 seller to exit, or winning at a price of zero are settled
3Note that both Bulow and Klemperer (1996) and Myerson (1981) consider the strategically equivalent
case of an individual selling an indivisible unit of a good to N possible buyers.
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randomly. Any seller who does not win the auction receives a payoff of zero. The buyer
is informed of the auction price and chooses to either accept the auction price, resulting in
payoffs of v− p for the buyer and p− ci for the winner, or makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer o
to the winner. In the case of the latter, the winning seller either accepts the offer, resulting
in payoffs of v − o and o− ci, or rejects the offer and all parties receive a zero payoff.
A seller’s strategy has two parts: a function that maps from possible unit costs to auction
exit prices; and a function that maps from possible counter-offer information sets to reject
and accept decisions. The buyer’s strategy is a function that maps from possible value and
auction price pairs to possible counter offers join with accepting the auction outcome. We
show the strategy profile in which each seller exits the auction at her unit cost and accepts
any profitable take-it-or-leave-it offer, and the buyer accepts all auction prices below some
threshold level - conditional on v - otherwise makes an optimal counter offer is a Nash
equilibrium.
Consider the optimality of the buyer’s strategy conditional upon those of the sellers. The
buyer’s conditional payoff function is
pi(o|v, p) = max{v − p,max(v − o)G(o|p)}. (1)
G(o|p) is the buyer’s subjective probability distribution of the auction winner’s cost which
need be not derived according to Bayes rule, but o+ G(o|p)
g(o|p) must be strictly increasing. The
first order condition for an interior maximum of the second argument of (1) implies,
v − o∗ = G(o
∗|p)
g(o∗|p) . (2)
We provide an economic interpretation of Equation (2) from the theory of a price setting
monopsonist; a direct analog to the classic interpretations of optimal forward auctions with
monopoly theory (Bulow and Roberts, 1989; Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). In this case the
buyer is a monopsonist, the probability of purchase is analogous to market quantity, q, and
the offer o is analogous to market price set by the monopsonist. The buyer’s marginal and
average values (of additional probability of successfully purchasing) are the same constant
v. Now the market supply function is the buyer’s subjective posterior distribution of the
winner’s cost, i.e q = G(o|p). And the marginal cost (of additional probability of successfully
purchasing) is MC(G(o|p)) = o+ G(o|p)
g(o|p) . If there is an optimal interior quantity G(o
∗|p), we
know it is found where MR = MC, which is simply Equation (2).
The relationship between v, market supply, and marginal cost are depicted in the left
hand graph of Figure 1. In the right hand of this Figure, we depict an interior solution, and
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two types of corner solutions. In one corner solution, marginal cost never exceeds v in which
case o∗ = G−1(1|p1). In the other corner solution, the buyer believes with probability zero
that the winner’s cost is below his value, see G(o|p2), and thus setting o∗ = v is an optimal
offer.4 In all three cases, the buyer accepts the auction outcome if v − p ≥ (v − o∗)G(o∗|p).
Figure 1: Optimal offer: the left graph illustrates an interior solution. The right graph
illustrates an interior solution for auction price p, a corner solution for p1 where marginal cost
never crosses v and o∗ = G−1(1|p1), and another corner solution for p2 where G−1(0|p2) > v
and o∗ = v.
$ $ 
Thinking of G(o|p) as a state dependent supply function, where the state is the realized
auction price, the optimal state pricing rule is found by rewriting Equation (2) as
o∗ =
v
1 +
1
EG,o(o∗)
, where EG,o(o) =
o
G(o|p)g(o|p). (3)
In other words, EG,o(o) is the price elasticity of the supply function, and Equation (3) is the
standard monopsony inverse elasticity pricing rule.
When G(o|p) is calculated according to Bayes’ rule this elasticity function is the same
across all states, and o∗ is state invariant for interior solutions. To see this, first consider the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let ci, i = 1, . . . N , be independent realizations from the distribution F ,
with ordering c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cN , then the conditional distribution of c1 given c2, is the same
distribution as F truncated at c2.
Proof: This is Theorem 2.7 of David (1981).
4In this case the optimal offer is set valued, o∗ = [0, G−1(0|p2)].
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In equilibrium, the auction price equals the realized second lowest cost, and according to
this proposition the Bayesian posterior is
G(o|p) = F (o)
F (p)
. (4)
Thus, the state dependent supply functions have a multiplicative relationship. For exam-
ple for two different auction outcomes, p′ and p′′, their Bayesian posteriors are related as fol-
lows, G(o|p′) = F (p′′)
F (p′)G(o|p′′). One of the properties of an elasticity measure is that it’s invari-
ant to multiplicative scaling of the relationship. Accordingly, one can show EG,o(o) = EF,o(o)
and the optimal monopsony pricing rule of Equation (3) is invariant of the price, i.e.,
o∗ =
v
1 +
1
EF,o(o∗)
. (5)
In summary, the Bayesian posterior is simply a scalar proportion of the prior. Corre-
spondingly, the elasticity of the posterior does not change and neither does the optimal offer,
as indicated by Equation (5). However, the probability that the optimal offer is accepted by
the auction winner does change and is inversely proportional to the prior evaluated at the
auction price as indicated by Equation (4).
Briefly, the seller’s strategy is an optimal response given the buyer’s strategy because she
can never strictly increase her payoff by accepting an offer above her cost, nor by rejecting
one above her cost. Correspondingly, exiting the auction at her cost is optimal by standard
arguments (For example, see Krishna (2009) page 15.) for exiting at cost in typical private
cost English auctions.
Consider the following example which is also the setting we use in our experiment. The
distribution of the buyer’s value H(v) is the uniform distribution on [50, 150]. There are two
sellers and F (c) is the uniform distribution on [0, 100]. Notice, that F (c) is a linear function
so its elasticity is always 1, as is the elasticity of any posterior. For a realized value v, by
Equation (3), o∗ = v/2. So while the optimal threshold does not depend upon price, the
post auction probability of a purchase when engaging in take-it-or-leave-it bargaining does.
Suppose v = 100 and consider three scenarios: p1 = 100, p2 = 60, and p3 = 10. Figure 2
depicts that the optimal offer is the same in the first two scenarios, but the probability of
purchase differs, and the optimal decision is to accept the auction in the last scenario.
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Figure 2: The optimal offer for v = 100 and F (c) = c
100
. For p > 50 the optimal counter
offer is 50 and does not vary with the price, but the corresponding probability of purchasing,
G(50|p) does. For p ≤ 50 the buyer accepts the auction outcome.
$ 
3 Experimental design and hypotheses
3.1 Experimental design
Our experiment consists of the following session flow. First, we recruit 18 subjects to par-
ticipate in a two hour experimental session. We randomly designate 6 subjects as buyers
and 12 subjects as sellers; these designations are fixed for the session. The session consists
of 2 practice periods and 30 rounds for which subjects receive compensation based upon
their decisions. Every period we randomly form 6 trios consisting of 2 sellers and 1 buyer.
Participants are informed of the random rematching protocol and that all costs and values
are redrawn each period.
Each trio plays the previous example of the auction-bargaining mechanism, and we in-
duce common knowledge by publicly reading and displaying instructions at the start of the
experiment.5 Each period starts with each buyer and seller learning their respective value
and cost. The two sellers in a trio participate in a descending English clock auction - without
knowing the buyer’s realized value. The initial auction price is $100 and decrements by $1
every 0.7 second. When a seller exits the auction, the auction concludes with winner and
price determination as previously indicated.6 Next, the buyer is informed of his auction price
and presented the choice to either accept the auction outcome or make a take-it-or-leave-it
5Instructions are available upon request from the authors.
6We never observe a case where both sellers don’t exit and the auction closes at a price of zero.
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offer to the auction winning seller. If he accepts the auction outcome, all trio members are
informed of their payoffs and the period concludes. If the buyer instead engages in bargain-
ing, the auction winner is presented with the counteroffer and decides whether to accept or
reject. In either case, payoffs are reported and the period ends.
We conducted 8 sessions at the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory (FEEL)
at Xiamen University.7 This gives us a total of 144 subjects (48 buyers and 96 sellers) each
with 30 observations. Subjects on average earned 70 RMB for their participation. We
recruited subjects through the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004), all of whom were undergrad-
uate and graduate students enrolled in Xiamen University, and none had previous experience
in this study. The experimental software was programmed in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3.2 Hypotheses
Our ex ante hypotheses consists of one regarding economic performance and three regarding
buyer and seller behavior. The main result of the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) study is
that while the auction-bargaining offers the auctioneer more value than a simple N -bidder
English auction, it offers the auctioneer less value than adding another serious bidder8 and
conducting a N + 1 bidder English auction.
Hypothesis 1. Buyer profit is greater than expected profit in a two-bidder English auction
and less than a three-bidder English auction.9
Next, the Seller’s Nash equilibrium strategy provides two additional hypothesize. This
first is about seller’s behavior in the auction phase of the auction-bargaining mechanism.
Hypothesis 2. Sellers exit the auction at their realized costs.
We have a strong prior for confirming this hypothesis due to previous experimental re-
sults on independent private value forward (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus, 1980) and private
cost reverse (Shachat and Wei, 2012) English auctions that show close adherence to theoreti-
cal predictions regarding expected price and bidders’ strategy. However, there is uncertainty
regarding how the bargaining phase plays out in the experiment and how this change in feed-
back affects the saliency of the seller optimal action in the auction. For example, a rational
7This facility is designed for the purpose of conducting economic experiments and has privacy carrels, a
private payment and sign-in area, and a separate monitor room from which the experimenter conducts the
experiment.
8In our design, sometimes a seller fails to satisfy the serious bidder criteria ci ≤ v. However, our design
does satisfy the more lax sufficient condition that the losing supplier’s expected cost is no more than the
buyer’s value. See Bulow and Klemperer (1996) page 185 footnote 15 for more detail.
9In this paper, we use the theoretical predictions of the two and three bidder English auctions benchmarks
to test this hypothesis rather than run separate control treatments.
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seller may “overstay” in the auction if she has a ”joy of winning” the auction component
in her utility function or she believes with probability one there will be a counteroffer and
an opportunity to reject it. Alternatively, she may fail to make a rational choice because
of difficulty perceiving the optimal strategy, as often is found in the sealed bid second price
auctions.
Our second hypothesis about sellers concerns behavior when a seller confronts a take-it-
or-leave-it offer.
Hypothesis 3. Sellers don’t reject profitable offers, and reject non-profitable ones.
This hypothesis derived from sequential rationality has a stronger alternative hypothesis
than it would appear at first glance. The bargaining phase of the game is strategically equiv-
alent to an ultimatum game in which the buyer and seller only respectively know the upper
and lower ends of the ”pie” interval to be shared. The very large literature on Ultimatum
Game experiments, starting with Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982), has shown that
a non-negligible proportion of responders reject minimally profitable offers. In particular,
this still holds true in studies that introduce asymmetric information about the pie size
(Croson, 1996; Huck, 1999; Harstad and Nagel, 2004). However, a glaring counterexample
are the results of Salmon and Wilson (2008) who study a two unit experimental English
auction where the first unit is sold to the auction winner and a take-it-or-leave-it offer is
made to the last exiting bidder for the second unit. In this study, approximately only 4% of
profitable offers were rejected. Our study is similar in that we imbed the ultimatum game
as an after stage to the auction to determine possible responder participation. However, our
setting differs as we have two-sided incomplete information and the responder does not have
incentives to misrepresent her type (cost).
Our final hypothesis, developed in the previous section, regards the buyer’s behavior.
Hypothesis 4. Buyers follow their optimal strategy according to Bayesian posteriors.
4 Results
Our experimental data set consists of 1440 plays of the auction-bargaining mechanism, each
including the losing seller’s exit price and the buyer’s decision of whether to bargain. Buyers
chose to bargain 963 times, and the winning seller rejected the take-it-or-leave-it offer 280
of these times. We start by comparing observed economic performance versus theoretical
benchmarks for buyer profit, seller profit, and welfare improving trades. Then we examine
the extent subjects follow their Nash equilibrium strategies.
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4.1 Market performance
We start by presenting various summary statistics of our auction-bargaining with 2 sellers
experiments, and the corresponding theoretical benchmarks from English auctions with 2
and 3 sellers. Table 1 presents these statistics and theoretical benchmarks. Note when
calculating the theoretical benchmarks of the English auctions for expected buyer and seller
profit, and potential social surplus, max{0, v−min{ci}}, we use the realizations of the buyers’
values and sellers’ cost rather than the distributions they are drawn from.
Table 1: Realized economic performance versus theoretical benchnmarks
Theoretical Prediction
A-B Mechanism A-B Mechanism English auct. English auct.
Performance Measure experiment equilibrium 2 bidders 3 bidders
Average buyer profit 40.66 43.92 36.83 51.64
Standard deviation 32.54
Average seller profit 21.91 16.84 25.23 21.11
Standard deviation 20.92
% of Periods with trade 80.56 79.58 95.14a 97.57a
a For the English auctions, the reported value is the percentage of auctions for which v ≥ min{ci}.
A first observation is that the main theorem of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) holds.
Result 1. Using the auction-bargaining mechanism, buyer profit is greater than expected
profit in a two-bidder English auction and less than a three-bidder English auction. Hypoth-
esis 1 is confirmed by the t-tests of the third and fourth row of Table 2.
While the qualitative prediction regarding the buyer’s welfare is confirmed. Table 2 shows
that we reject the theoretical predictions of average buyer and seller profit. Either the buyers
or sellers are not uniformly following their respective equilibrium strategies. We show it is
the buyers, not the sellers, who are deviating.
4.2 Seller behavior
Do sellers exit the auction when price reaches their costs? Consider Figure 3, which plots
the 1440 exit prices for the auction losing sellers versus their respective costs. There is a
clear concentration of observations along the forty-five degree line. To provide quantitative
evidence that sellers exit at price equals costs we conduct an ordinary least squares regression,
finding an intercept of 3 and a slope coefficient of 0.95 (with an adjusted R2 statistic of
0.94). If we suppress the intercept term, then the slope coefficient is 0.99. These results
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Table 2: Hypothesis tests comparing observed profit and theoretical benchmarks
Player Null Alternative
role hypothesis hypothesis t-statistica p-value
AB = AB equilibriumb AB 6= AB equilibrium −3.80 0.00
Buyer AB = EA 2 biddersc AB > EA 2 bidders 4.47 0.00
AB = EA 3 bidders AB < EA 3 bidders −12.78 0.00
Auction AB = AB equilibrium AB 6= AB equilibrium 9.18 0.00
Winning AB = EA 2 bidders AB > EA 2 bidders −6.02 0.00
Seller AB = EA 3 bidders AB > EA 3 bidders 1.45 0.93
a The t-stat is calculated µ¯−µ0
σˆµ/
√
n
, where µ¯ is the sample average, µ0 is the theoretical prediction, the
number of observations is n = 1440, and σˆµ is the sample standard deviation. The test statistic has a
student-t distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom.
b AB is the Auction-Bargaining mechanism.
c EA is the English auction.
are consistent with those previously found in English auctions in both forward (Coppinger,
Smith, and Titus, 1980) and reverse (Shachat and Wei, 2012) contexts. Admittedly, there is
some evidence that the potential bargaining phase leads to some overstaying in the auction
for high costs, as seen in Figure 3, and noisy adherence to the equilibrium strategy. For
example, the percentage of absolute deviations of bids from cost less than $1, $2, and $3 are
respectively 56.5%, 75.0%, and 82.6%. With these minor caveats, we state our next result.
Result 2. Sellers tend to exit the auction at their realized costs, confirming Hypothesis 2.
Turning our attention to seller behavior in the bargaining phase, Figure 4 plots the 963
take-it-or-leave-it offers versus the winning seller’s cost. The forty-five degree line separates
profitable and non-profitable offers. First note that sellers reject all 274 non-profitable offers,
but only 6 out of the 689 offers that exceed the seller’s cost. Clearly, the types of reciprocal
behavior and other regarding preferences found pervasive in Ultimatum Bargaining experi-
ments are not a factor here. These results also demonstrate the robustness of the findings
in Salmon and Wilson (2008).
Result 3. Sellers rarely reject profitable offers, and always reject non-profitable ones, con-
firming Hypothesis 3.
4.3 Buyer behavior
Our assessment of how the buyers’ choices agree with their equilibrium strategy starts with
a visualization of the buyer’s decisions in Figure 5. In this figure the x-axis is the buyer’s
11
Figure 3: Auction exit price versus realized cost
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value and the y-axis is the value of the auction price and take-it-or-leave-it offer. A triangle
marks an accepted auction price. A closed circle marks a rejected auction price, and the
connected open circle is the corresponding take-it-or-leave-it offer. The upper line flowing
from southwest to northeast is where auction price (and counter offer) equals the buyer value.
The lower line is where auction price (and counter offer) equals one-half the buyer value,
i.e. the theoretical prediction. We refer to this as the optimal offer line (OOL). If buyers
adhere perfectly to the equilibrium strategy, all auction prices below the OOL are accepted
and those above are rejected and countered with an offer on the OOL. Note, we are only
plotting a randomly selected one-fourth of the data to avoid over-cluttering.
The figure suggests mixed evidence regarding how theory does track the data. Buyers
reject 82% of the auction prices above the OOL, and accept 74% of those below the OOL;
roughly matching the theoretical predictions. However, we can recognize there are three types
of behavior which deviate the theoretical prediction. First, we observe that when some high
auction prices are rejected, the subsequent counteroffer is greater than the theoretical optimal
offer. Second, some auction prices above the OOL are accepted. Third, some counteroffers
are below the OOL, with some associated with rejected auction prices below the OOL. We
explore whether these deviations are unbiased noisy adoption of equilibrium strategies, or
are they reflecting alternative structural behavior.
A natural way to test the veracity of the buyer’s equilibrium strategy, modulo unbiased
12
Figure 4: Plot of take-it-or-leave-it offers versus the auction winning seller’s cost: an open
circles marks an accepted offer and a solid circle marks a rejected offer.
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error terms, is to nest it in the following Tobit regression model. We assume that a buyers
optimal offer is a linear function of his value and the auction price plus some normally
distributed error term. We observe his optimal offer whenever is less than the auction price,
otherwise it is censored at the auction price. Formally, the Tobit model is
oit =
α + βpit + γvit + it, if α + βpit + γvit + it < pitpit, if α + βpit + γvit + it ≥ pit , (6)
where it is a normally distributed error term, N(0, σ
2
 ).
If buyers follow the optimal strategy, given in Equation (1), then we should find α = β = 0,
and γ = 0.5. We report the maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (6) in Table 3.10
The Tobit regression results in Table 3 reveal that the theory does a remarkably good job
of predicting when a buyer chooses to bargain, but fails to capture important aspects of what
determines the size of take-it-or-leave-it offers. First, we expect a buyer to bargain when
α+γ
1−β v < p. We find that α is not significant and then by substituting parameter estimates for
γ and β, we estimate the condition for choosing to bargain condition is 0.34
1−0.35v = 0.52v < p;
10Out of concern that buyers use one rule to determine when to bargain and another to determine the
counter offer, we attempt to estimate a sample selection model. However, the correlation coefficient ρ always
converges to one - leading to a singular Information matrix. We interpret this as strong evidence that the
selection and offer models are the same.
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Figure 5: Buyer choices conditional on realized value: accepted auction prices and reject
auction prices with counteroffer. A solid triangle is an accepted auction price. A solid circle
is a rejected auction price, and the connected open circle is the subsequent counteroffer. The
upper dashed line is the 45 degree line indicating where auction prices equal buyer values.
The solid line is the theoretical optimal offer line. In equilibrium, we should see all prices
above this line rejected with counter offers on the line, and all prices below the line accepted.
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almost exactly what the theory predicts. However, inconsistent with the theoretical predic-
tion is the significant positive relationship price has on the take-it-or-leave-it offer amount.
We seek to explain this systematic deviation from the theory.
First, we identify significant individual heterogeneity in the buyers’ sensitivities to price.
We estimate an individual linear Tobit model for each buyer and report the sum of individual
Log-likelihood values, in the last row of Table 3. A likelihood ratio test soundly rejects the
pooled model in favor of the individual model. In Figure 6 we present scatter plots of the
estimated individual coefficients for price and value. We classify three types of individual
estimates: open squares mark the cases that we can’t reject that α and β are jointly zero via
an F -test, open triangles mark the estimated coefficients for the 5 subjects whose estimated
α is significantly different from zero, and closed circles mark the estimated coefficients for
all others.
These scatter plots of individual estimated pairs β and γ demonstrate that individuals
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Table 3: MLE of the linear Tobit model for the pooled data
Variable Estimate Standard Errora
Constant −0.24 3.23
Price 0.35*** 0.05
Value 0.34*** 0.02
σ 12.68
*** 0.73
Log Likelihood Pooled -4070
Log Likelihood Individual -3444
a Standard errors are clustered by session.
*** Coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
generally agree on when to bargain, but differ in how strong counter offers depend upon
the auction price. We provide a vertical reference line at β = 0 and a horizontal reference
line at γ = 0.5. The line with a slope of negative one-half passing through (0, 0.5) repre-
sents the pairs of parameter values corresponding to the rule of negotiating when p > 0.5v.
South-eastern movements along this line, away from (0, 0.5), indicate counteroffers with an
increasing positive relationship with auction price. We separate individuals into those whose
offers depend upon price, identifying them with solid circles, and those whose offers don’t,
identifying them with open squares. The distribution of estimated parameter pairs are clus-
tered around the theoretical line, as suggested by the close agreement between this and the
fitted line, for rejection of the auction price but spanning a large range of price sensitivity of
counter offers. A natural question is whether these dependencies of take-it-or-leave-it offers
on auction prices are consistent with less restrictive assumptions on subject preferences or
formation of beliefs.
Figure 6: Individual estimated price and value coefficients from the linear Tobit model
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5 Alternative models
In this section we explain buyer behavior by supposing posterior beliefs regarding the auction
winner’s cost are distortions of the Bayes rule determined posteriors. We parameterize these
distortions using a well known probability weighting function that allows an interpretation
of subjects perceiving various kinds of affiliation between the lowest and second lowest real-
ized costs. We also show the observed patterns of when buyers choose to bargain and the
positive relationship between take-it-or-leave-it offers and auction price can’t be explained
by models solely assuming risk aversion or anticipated regret, models that have previous
success explaining empirical auction behavior.
5.1 A model of transformed Bayesian posteriors
We previously showed that the invariance of the buyer’s optimal offer depends on the use of
Bayes’ rule to formulate the posterior distribution of the auction winning seller’s cost. We
now generalize from Bayesian updating by using a two-parameter transformation of Bayesian
posteriors. Namely, the buyer’s subjective posterior of the winner seller’s cost is
G(o|p) =
 0 if o = 0e−µ(− ln(F (o)F (p)))λ if 0 < o ≤ p , (7)
where µ and λ > 0.
Readers may recognize that Equation (7) is the Prelec (1998) form of a probability
weighting function. Probability weighting is a component of Prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) capturing the empirical regularity that individuals’ valuation of a risky
prospect is more sensitive to changes in probabilities close to zero and one than at more cen-
tral quantiles. This common pattern of valuation results in an inverted S-shape probability
weighting function. Since we are modeling distorted posteriors we adopt the Prelec form
which allows various forms of biases. Using our uniform prior, for example, the unbiased
transformation of the Bayesian posterior is the linear G(o|p) presented in Figure 7. Now
consider the short-dashed S-shaped G(o|p) in the same figure. In this case, the bias reflects
a single-peaked posterior PDF with a modal belief that the winner’s cost is about 50% of
the auction price; essentially perceiving a non-existent affiliation between the auction price
and the winner’s cost. A stronger bias towards a positive affiliation in costs is found in the
convex shaped G(o|p), while a concave G(o|p) suggests a bias in favor of low costs.11 In this
11When λ = 1 this model is behavioral indistinguishable from a model of a buyer whose expected util-
ity function is u(x) = x
1
µ . One can establish this by making the preference invariant transformation
Z
(
(v − o)
(
F (o)
F (p)
)µ)
= (v − o) 1µ F (o)F (p) , where Z(y) = y
1
µ . We refer the reader to Goeree, Holt, and Pal-
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case the subjective posterior puts increasing probability mass nearer the auction price. Let’s
finally consider the inverted S-shaped G(o|p) which implies increasing posterior beliefs on
costs close to zero and the price. This suggests a rather unusual u-shaped posterior PDF.
Figure 7: Alternative shapes for transformed posterior distribution function, G(o|p), and
density function, g(o|p)
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Now suppose a buyer formulates his posterior distribution of the auction winner’s cost
according to Equation (7). The next proposition describes when there is a unique optimal
offer, and under what conditions an interior optimal offer is strictly increasing in price.
Proposition 2. Assuming F (c) is the uniform distribution and G(o|p) is calculated according
to Equation (7), then
(i) if λ ≥ 1 and f ′(o) ≤ 0, then o+ G(o|p)
g(o|p) is strictly increasing and there is a unique o
∗;
(ii) if λ > 1, then an interior optimal offer o∗ is strictly increasing in the auction price p.
Proof: See appendix.
A buyer’s Nash equilibrium strategy, when following our two parameter subjective pos-
terior model, directly leads to the following non-linear Tobit regression model;
oit =
o∗it(µ, λ|pit, vit) + it, if o∗it(µ, λ|pit, vit) + it < pitpit, if o∗it(µ, λ|pit, vit) + it ≥ pit
frey (2002) p.265 for further discussions.
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where it is a normally distributed error term, N(0, σ
2
 ), and o
∗
it(µ, λ|pit, vit) comes from the
first order condition v − o∗ = G(o∗|p)
g(o∗|p) .
The likelihood function of the non-linear Tobit model is,
max
µ,λ
L(µ, λ, σ2|o, v, p) =
48∏
i=1
30∏
t=1
∏
pit≤oit
Pr(o∗it ≥ pit)
∏
pit>oit
f(oit|o∗it < pit) Pr(o∗it < pit).
Table 4 reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of this nonlinear Tobit model.
The estimates of µ = 2.39 and λ = 1.35 imply that G(o|p) is s-shaped and there is a positive
relationship between the offers and auction prices.12 A Wald test rejects the Bayesian model,
µ = λ = 1, in favor of this subjective prior model with a p-value of less than 0.001. Once
again there is significant heterogeneity across individuals as a full fixed coefficient model can’t
be rejected with a likelihood ratio test (see the last row of Table 4 for the Log-likelihood
value of the fixed coefficient regression.)
The fixed coefficient model exhibits a diversity of behavioral rules which we now connect
to the individual estimates of the structural parameters µ and λ. First, we present in Figure 8
a scatter plot of each buyer’s joint estimate of (µi, λi). We classify each buyer’s subjective
posterior PDF according to the following joint hypothesis tests.13
1. Uniform - we fail to reject µ = λ = 1.
2. Unimodal - we reject λ = 1 in favor of λ > 1.
3. U-shaped - we reject λ = 1 in favor of λ < 1.
4. Strictly increasing - we fail to reject λ = 1 and we reject µ = 1 in favor of µ > 1.
5. Strictly decreasing - we fail to reject λ = 1 and we reject µ = 1 in favor of µ < 1.
Let’s consider four subjects with differing shaped subjective posterior PDF’s, and com-
pare their behavior in the experiment. First, consider Buyer A whose parameter estimates
are marked “A” in Figure 8 and close to the Bayesian type at (1,1). Buyer A’s estimated
g(o|p) and his choice data are presented in the first row of plots of Figure 9. Here we see
that his subjective posterior transformation is nearly one-to-one with the Bayesian posterior,
and correspondingly his experimental choices of when to bargain and consequent take-it-or-
leave-it offers closely agree with the theory. Buyer B, in contrast, has a unimodal subjective
PDF consistent with a disproportionately high perception that the auction winner’s cost be
between 20-80% of the auction price. This leads Buyer B to reject every auction outcome
12Finding probability weighting functions that are not inverted s-shaped is common in strategic decision
tasks; for example bidders in first price sealed bid auctions have been estimated to have convex shaped
functions (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2002; Ratan, 2012) and s-shaped in normal form games (Goeree, Holt,
and Palfrey, 2003).
13We choose a test size of 0.05 in each case.
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Table 4: MLE of the non-linear Tobit model with the two parameter subjective
posterior model
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
µ 2.39*** 0.002
λ 1.35*** 0.002
σ 11.31
*** 0.248
Log Likelihood Pooled -4070a
Log Likelihood Individual -3613
*** Coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
a This is not a typo, this is the same value for the maximized likelihood as we find for the linear
Tobit model. However, the linear Tobit model has one more parameter than the nonlinear
Tobit model.
Figure 8: Individual estimates of parameters µ and λ from the subjective posterior model
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and make aggressive counter offers. Buyer C’s posterior reflects a different belief of affili-
ation; the strictly increasing posterior PDF reflects a belief the winner’s cost is very likely
close to the auction price.14 Consequently, the buyer seldom rejects the auction outcome
and demands very small price reductions in the few cases he does. On the other end of the
optimism spectrum, is Buyer D whose strictly decreasing posterior PDF exhibits a strong
negative bias on the winners cost, and leads to a high rejection rate and very aggressive
counteroffers.
14The reader may notice that we estimate seven buyers having inverted s-shaped G(o|p); however, in each
of these cases the function is essentially convex with only a slight overweighing of a small interval of low
probabilities.
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Figure 9: Four different estimated g(o|p) and the corresponding buyer subject’s behavior
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(a) Buyer A (µ, λ) = (1.05, 1.10)
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(b) Buyer B (µ, λ) = (1.28, 1.88)
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(c) Buyer C (µ, λ) = (6.20, 0.96)
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(d) Buyer D (µ, λ) = (0.59, 1.00)
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5.2 Risk aversion and anticipated regret: two (non)explanations
Two behavioral models successfully used to explain bidder deviations from Nash equilibrium
strategies are risk aversion (Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982; Cox, Smith, and Walker,
1988) and anticipated regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2007, 2009; Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay, 2007). However, neither model can explain the positive relationship between auction
prices and take-it-or-leave-it offers. Risk aversion can only influence the location of the
optimal offer line. While in the case of anticipated loss regret, there is no impact on the
buyer’s strategy when the auction price exceeds his value and there is a negative relationship
between take-it-or-leave-it offers and auction prices when his value exceeds the auction price.
First consider the case where the buyer is strictly risk averse but forms Bayesian pos-
teriors. The following proposition shows that for any v the optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer
exceeds the risk neutral offer and does not vary with price.
Proposition 3. Assume the buyer’s expected utility function satisfies u(0) = 0, u′(x) > 0,
and u′′(x) < 0, then
(i) the optimal offer o∗ is greater than the optimal offer for the risk neutral case.
(ii) For an interior optimal offer o∗, ∂o
∗
∂p
= 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Consider an example in which a buyer in our experiment has the expected utility function
u(x) = xr, characterized by the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 − r. For a
strictly positive r, the buyer’s Nash equilibrium strategy is to accept all auction prices below
the threshold o∗(v; r) and to counter offer this threshold otherwise. It is straight forward
to show that o∗(v; r) = v
1+r
. In Figure 10, the left hand side plot shows the hypothetical
behavior of a buyer for whom r = 0.5. Clearly the offers don’t depend upon the price and
OOL is steeper than the risk neutral case.
Now we show that in a model of anticipated regret, there is no relationship between the
optimal offer and auction price when this price exceeds the buyer’s value and the relationship
is negative when the auction price is below the buyer’s value. In an anticipated regret model
the decision maker’s utility function includes disutility for the failure to capture all ex post
realized potential gains by ex ante decisions. For buyers in our experiment both loss and a
win regrets are possible. A loss regret occurs when the buyer opts to bargain rather than
accept a profitable auction price and then his take-it-or-leave-it offer is rejected. A win
regret occurs when an offer is accepted, and the buyer realizes a lower offer could have been
accepted. In this case the magnitude of the win regret is unknown, unlike the case of loss
regret. Here we follow the suggestion of Davis, Katok, and Kwasnica (2011) and set the win
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regret equal to the accepted offer less the expected winner seller’s cost conditional on this
bargaining outcome; namely o
2
.15
Let’s consider an explicit model in which win and loss regrets result in decrements to
utility by proportional penalties ωw and ωl respectively. In this case we can express the
expected utility of an offer o as
E[u(o|v, p;ωw, ωl)] =

(
v − o
(
1 +
ωw
2
)) o
p
if p ≥ v(
v − o
(
1 +
ωw
2
)) o
p
− ωl (v − p)
(
1− o
p
)
if p < v.
(8)
Conditional upon bargaining, the optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer is
o∗(v, p, ;ωw, ωl) =

v
2
(
1 + ωw
2
) if p ≥ v
v + ωl (v − p)
2
(
1 + ωw
2
) if p < v. (9)
From Equation (9) when the auction price exceeds the buyer’s value, his optimal offer
does not depend upon the auction price. When price is below his value, then there exists
a negative relationship which is the opposite of what we observe. When deciding whether
to bargain, the buyer evaluates whether v − p exceeds his expected utility (8) evaluated at
his optimal offer given in Equation (9). We present the hypothetical decisions of a buyer for
whom ωw = 0 and ωl = 0.5 on the right hand side of Figure 10.
15We proceed assuming there is no winner’s regret for accepting the auction outcome. Doing so only
influences the decision whether to bargain - not the actual amount of the optimal offer conditional on
bargaining.
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Figure 10: Buyer behavior under risk aversion and anticipated regret: some hypothetical
decisions for randomly selected scenarios
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(a) Risk averse buyer where r = 0.5
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(b) Anticipated regret buyer where (ωw, ωl) = (0, 0.5)
6 Experimental treatment testing robustness
After reporting our main experimental results and subsequent ex post behavioral explana-
tions, it’s natural to question the robustness of these results to the information subjects
are given and alternative explanations of buyer behavior. We report on three additional
experimental treatments to address theses concerns. First, we examine whether sellers learn
to adhere more closely to the equilibrium strategy in the auction phase or learn to be more
“imperfect” in the bargaining phase when given more extensive feedback on the procurement
outcome. Second, we test whether our estimated transformed subjective posteriors are ac-
tually non-equilibrium beliefs by having buyers play against automated equilibrium playing
sellers - and informing buyers of this. Finally, we investigate whether distorted posteriors
can be corrected by providing buyers with an expert decision support system which is based
on the true probabilities an offer will be accepted.
6.1 Effects of enriching sellers’ feedback
Procurement processes in practice generally provide a richer set of feedback to auction losing
sellers than we do. The Nash equilibrium doesn’t change if we inform the auction loser of
the subsequent actions taken in the bargaining phase; however, this additional information
could affect seller behavior through more rapid learning, or invoking social preference norms.
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Accordingly we conduct two sessions, using the same pairings, values and costs from two
sessions of our original treatment, but now inform the auction losing seller about buyers deci-
sion to bargain, the amount of any take-it-or-leave-it offer, and the winning sellers response.
We call this the Enriched Feedback (EF) treatment.
We find no significant differences in the sellers’ auction or bargaining behaviors. We
pool the auction data from the first two sessions of the original treatment with the two
EF sessions and then estimate the bid function component of the seller’s strategy. Table 5
reports the OLS estimates in Panel A. First, we note that an F -tests fails to reject the
absence of treatment effects in both the slope and constant terms. Further the slope, as in
the original treatment, is very close to one. Given the lack of a treatment effect, we find with
enriched feedback sellers still don’t exactly bid their cost. Panel B of Table 5 shows as slight
increase in the number of absolute bid deviations from cost of less than one dollar, but also
a slight increase in the number of deviations greater than three dollars. With respect to the
Bargaining Phase, there is essentially no treatment effect. Sellers rejected only 3 out of 188
profitable offers in the EF treatment and 0 out of 169 profitable offers in the corresponding
two sessions of the original treatment.
Table 5: Comparison of sellers’ behavior in the auction phase for the Original and Enriched
Feedback treatments
Panel A: OLS estimation of the sellers’ auction bid functions
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant 2.79*** 0.79
do
a −1.19 1.13
Cost 0.97*** 0.01
do×Cost 0.01 0.02
Adjusted-R2 0.95
H0: Coefficients of do and do×Cost are jointly zero F -stat = 2.63b p-value = 0.07
*** Coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
a dO is the dummy variable for the Original treatment
b The distribution of the test statistic is F2,716(x).
Panel B: comparison of cumulative absolute bid deviations from realized costs
Treatment |b− c| ≤ 1 |b− c| ≤ 2 |b− c| ≤ 3
Enriched Feedback 66.39% 74.17% 78.61%
Original - first 2 sessions 60.83% 78.89% 87.50%
Original - all 8 sessions 56.53% 74.93% 82.64%
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6.2 Robustness of the transformed Bayesian posterior model
An alternative to our transformed posterior model is that subjects’ posteriors are Bayesian
but that their beliefs regarding the sellers’ strategies are incorrect.16 To test this alternative
hypothesis we conduct the Automated Seller (AS) treatment. In this treatment, all subjects
are buyers who face computerized sellers following their Nash equilibrium strategy. We
inform buyers that sellers are following this strategy.17 We conduct 3 sessions, each with 16
subjects, of this treatment. If buyers deviate from their equilibrium strategy in the original
treatment because of disequilibrium beliefs, then buyer behavior should now conform to
theoretical predictions. As we show shortly, they do not.
In our final treatment, we test whether transformed posteriors are a simple to correct bias.
In the Automated Seller with Calculator (ASC) treatment, we augment the AS treatment
by providing buyers with a calculator both when deciding whether to bargain and when
choosing the offer size. When the buyer enters a potential offer, the calculator returns six
items: profit if the buyer accepts the auction outcome, probability the offer will be accepted,
profit if the offer is accepted, probability the offer will be rejected, profit if the offer is
rejected (always zero), and the expected profit from making the offer. The calculator also
has a history window showing all previously evaluated offers of the current period, and
corresponding output. Further, before a buyer can submit a take-it-or-leave-it offer he is
required to successfully enter the offer in the calculator. This ensures the buyer has seen the
correct probability of his offer being accepted and the expected payoff. Despite providing
- and in fact obligating buyers to use - an expert decision support system, the positive
relationship between price and offers strengthens.
We first show how the two automated seller treatments alter the relationship between
auction prices and buyers’ offers. Table 6 presents the linear Tobit estimates of the buyers’
offers from the pooled Original, AS, and ASC treatments. While a likelihood ratio test
rejects this pooled regression in favor of a full fixed coefficient model, we still believe this
is an informative starting point for discussions. When switching from human (Original)
to automated sellers (AS) the sensitivity of offers with respect to price and value doesn’t
change. When we provide buyers with calculators the results are striking in that buyers’
offers have an even stronger positive relationship with the auction prices.
16For an discussion on the extensive use of rational models with disequilibrium beliefs please see Crawford,
Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013).
17We use the same sequences of realized costs and values as the buyers faced in our original treatment.
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Table 6: Linear Tobit estimates for the Original, AS, and ASC treatments: pooled data
Variable Estimatea Standard Errora
Constant −0.45 3.10
dAS −5.41* 3.16
dASC −4.49 3.31
Price 0.35*** 0.04
dAS×Price 0.03 0.04
dASC×Price 0.09*** 0.05
Value 0.34*** 0.01
dAS×Value −0.03** 0.01
dASC×Value −0.06*** 0.02
σ 12.34
*** 0.26
Log Likelihood Pooled -13451
Log Likelihood Individual -11518
Likelihood Ratio Test Stat. 3864b p-value = 0.00
a Standard errors are clustered by session.
b ***, **, and * indicate significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
c The null of the specification test is the pooled model and the alternative is the individual model. The
test statistic is LR = −2(LL Pooled− LL Individual) and is distributed χ2566.
Table 7: Non-linear Tobit estimates of the subjective posterior model for the Original, AS,
and ASC treatments: pooled dataa
Parameter Original Treatment AS Treatment ASC Treatment
µ 2.39 1.68 2.24
λ 1.35 1.46 1.71
σ 11.31 11.80 11.35
Log Likelihood Pooled -4070 -4769 -4592
Log Likelihood Individual -3613 -4359 -4012
a All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Likelihood ratio tests reject the pooled model in favor of
the individual model at a 1% level of significance for all 3 models.
In both the AS and ASC treatments, buyers exhibit subject posterior density functions
that are unimodal and whose modes occur at lower quantiles. Table 7 presents the non-linear
Tobit estimates of the subjective posterior model for the Original, AS, and ASC treatments.
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Figure 11: Estimated subjective posteriors for the Original, AS, and ASC treatments
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The three estimated subjective posterior densities are plotted in Figure 11. For AS and ASC,
the estimated posteriors reflect modes occurring at lower quantiles and lower density in the
top three deciles than for the Original treatment posterior. This reflects behaviorally in a
greater willingness to bargain and more aggressive offers because the perceived affiliation
between the winner’s cost and the auction price is stronger and the expected winner’s cost
is a smaller percentage of the price.
7 Concluding remarks
In this study we examine behavior in reverse English auctions, followed by a buyer option
to engage in ultimatum bargaining. As Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed, a Nash equi-
librium of this game implements the optimal mechanism for procurement. We find strong
support for this equilibrium modulo buyer’s ultimatum offers having a positive relationship
with auction prices. This turns out to have economic significance as the average buyer’s
surplus in our experiment was about 7.5% less than would have been earned with optimal
offers. For the procurement official using reverse auctions, our results provide justification
for the practice of engaging in post auction negotiations when qualifying additional suppli-
ers is not feasible. This justification is two-fold: expected buyer surplus increases and it
appears sellers do not harbor strong social utility concerns when being forced to negotiate
post auction. However, the behavioral issue of decision makers failing to use the information
revealed in the auction in an optimal Bayesian manner leads to unrealized potential benefits.
The bad news for procurement organizations is that our results reveal the suboptimal
processing of auction information is difficult to correct. As we show, simply providing ac-
curate decision support systems does not affect surplus improving behavior. This suggests
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either the subjective posterior model is a preference primitive and organizations need to
consider how to construct mechanisms to account for this, or it is a deep-seated bias that
requires more intensive training to correct.
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A Appendix
Proposition 2: Assuming F (c) is the uniform distribution and G(o|p) is calculated accord-
ing to Equation (7), then
(i) if λ ≥ 1 and f ′(o) ≤ 0, then o+ G(o|p)
g(o|p) is strictly increasing and there is a unique o
∗;
(ii) if λ > 1, then an interior optimal offer o∗ is strictly increasing in the auction price p.
Proof: Start by noting the following
g(o|p) = f(o) µλ
F (o)
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ−1
G(o|p),
and
g′(o|p) =f ′(o) µλ
F (o)
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ−1
G(o|p)− f 2(o) µλ
F 2(o)
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ−1
G(o|p)
− (λ− 1)f 2(o) µλ
F 2(o)
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ−2
G(o|p) + f 2(o) µ
2λ2
F 2(o)
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)2λ−2
G(o|p).
Now the derivative we are interested in is,
d(o+ G(o|p)
g(o|p) )
do
= 1 +
g2(o|p)−G(o|p)g′(o|p)
g2(o|p) = 2−
G(o|p)g′(o|p)
g2(o|p) .
Simplifying we get,
d(o+ G(o|p)
g(o|p) )
do
= 1+
1
µλ
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ−1 + λ− 1
µλ
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ − f ′(o)
µλf 2(o) 1
F (o)
(
− ln F (o)
F (p)
)λ−1 . (10)
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By inspection of Equation (10) we can that our assumption that λ ≥ 1 and f ′(o) ≤ 0
ensures this expression is positive.
Next, we substitute for G(o|P ) and g(o|P ) into Equation (2), the F.O.C for an interior
optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer, we have
µλ
p
o∗
(
− ln
(
o∗
p
))λ−1
=
p
v − o∗ .
Take ln to both sides,
ln(µλ)− ln(o∗) + (λ− 1) ln
(
− ln o
∗
p
)
+ ln (v − o∗) = 0.
We differentiate with respect to p at the optimal solution to obtain the following:
λ− 1
ln(p)− ln(o∗)
(
1
p
− 1
o∗
∂o∗
∂p
)
− 1
o∗
∂o∗
∂p
− 1
v − o∗
∂o∗
∂p
= 0. (11)
Rearranging terms we obtain
∂o∗
∂p
=
(λ− 1) (v − o∗) o∗(
v ln
(
p
o∗
)
+ (λ− 1) (v − o∗)) p. (12)
Obviously, the optimal offer should be smaller than the value and larger than the auction
price. Hence, when λ > 1, ∂o
∗
∂p
is strictly positive and the optimal offer is strictly increasing
in the auction price. Also note that when λ = 1 there is no relationship between optimal
offer o∗ and auction price p; not surprising as the model becomes observationally equivalent
to assuming the buyer is risk averse/loving utility. Finally, when λ < 1, ∂o
∗
∂p
is ambiguous.
Proposition 3: Assume the buyer’s expected utility function satisfies u(0) = 0, u′(x) > 0,
and u′′(x) < 0, then
(i) the optimal offer o∗ is greater than the optimal offer for the risk neutral case;
(ii) For an interior optimal offer o∗, ∂o
∗
∂p
= 0.
Proof: The first order condition for maximization can be expressed
u(v − o∗)f(o
∗)
F (p)
− u′(v − o∗)F (o
∗)
F (p)
= 0.
Rearranging terms yields
u(v − o∗)
u′(v − o∗) =
F (o∗)
f(o∗)
. (13)
Let z(x) = u(v−x)
u′(v−x) , then
z′(x) =
u(v − x)u′′(v − x)
u′(v − x)2 − 1.
By the strict concavity of u(x), z′(x) < −1.
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When o∗ = 0 the left hand side of (13) is strictly positive and the right hand side is zero.
Further, as the left hand side is strictly decreasing and the right hand side increasing, they
will intersect at most one time on the domain [0, p]. Since the slope of the left hand side is
less than -1 it is decreasing faster than the risk neutral case. Also the utility at u(0) = 0 the
same as in the risk neutral case, so u(v) > v. Therefore it will intersect the right hand side
higher at a higher offer level than the risk neutral case. Thus, the optimal offer is higher
than the risk neutral case.
Finally, the independence of the optimal offer from the auction price is clear from first
order condition expressed as (13).
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